Introduction

The Strait of Hormuz is a critical artery of the global economy, channelling a significant share of global crude oil and liquefied natural gas trade. Recent disruptions, transmitted primarily through trade and energy markets, have triggered sharp increases in energy prices, shipping costs, exchange-rate volatility, and global inflationary pressures. These effects have trickled down to the meso- and micro-levels, affecting feminised sectors such as garments, smallholder agriculture, and micro-enterprise activities before ultimately being felt at the household level.

Policy responses, however, continue to treat these developments largely as aggregate economic shocks. Yet macroeconomic shocks are never neutral. The Strait of Hormuz crisis provides further evidence that disruptions are also distributional events, transmitted through markets and institutions already structured by gender roles and gender inequalities. Their effects are shaped by unequal access to resources, labour market segmentation, and the unequal distribution of unpaid care responsibilities. This requires rethinking how economic shocks are analyzed, not only by examining trade and energy architectures, but also by looking at the social and household structures through which these shocks are ultimately absorbed.

What is happening

The Strait of Hormuz channels around one quarter of global seaborne oil trade, alongside significant volumes of liquefied natural gas and fertilizers (UNCTAD, 2026). Since late February 2026, ship transits through the Strait have fallen dramatically (by 95%), accompanied by steep price movements across multiple markets. Oil prices have risen by up to 34-67% across regions, natural gas prices have increased by 35% in Europe and over 70% in Asia, and food-related indices have also increased significantly, with fertilizer prices for some products rising by nearly 50%. Freight and insurance costs have surged as well (UNCTAD, 2026).

These are not isolated market adjustments. They represent a global price shock transmitted through trade, finance and supply chains, generating inflationary pressure, financial stress, labour market contractions, and remittance volatility, particularly in import-dependent developing economies that have limited fiscal space to respond.

Why shocks are not neutral

The uneven impact of macroeconomic shocks is not accidental. It reflects pre-existing inequalities, including in: 

• labour markets, where women are disproportionately employed in export-dependent sectors — such as textiles and garments, agriculture, and small entrepreneurship — that are highly exposed to trade disruptions and input price increases; 

• care activities, where women absorb adjustment through unpaid work;

• asset ownership, where women have lower access to credit, savings, and insurance;

• access to government support and procurement systems, from which women are often excluded because of their concentration in informal employment.

When shocks occur, these structures determine who absorbs the adjustment.

Across both natural and man-made crises, as well as structural shifts in the global economy, the transmission mechanisms are remarkably similar: trade disruptions, food price spikes, energy shocks, financial stress and natural disasters interact with existing inequalities. The pattern is consistent: women’s economic activity contracts earlier, recovery is slower, and household burdens increase.

Evidence across crises

The ongoing tariff-related tensions between the United States and its trading partners have disrupted export-dependent industries in developing countries, particularly textile and garment sectors that rely heavily on female labour. Higher tariffs have reduced labour demand leading to layoffs and reduced working hours for women concentrated in low-skilled positions, with knock-on effects on household food consumption, healthcare access, and school attendance (Agarwal and Zarrilli, 2026).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, women were more likely than men to exit the labour market due to the collapse of female-intensive sectors such as tourism and personal services, combined with rising care responsibilities (Zarrilli and Luomaranta, 2021). Female informal workers, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, were particularly exposed because of limited access to social protection. Informal cross-border trade, a female-dominated activity, experienced revenue declines of up to 60% due to border closures and rising transaction costs (UNCTAD, 2021).

Food and energy crises show similar dynamics. During the 2007–2008 food crisis, women reduced food intake, shifted to lower-quality diets, and absorbed household shocks through unpaid labour, while female-headed households experienced deeper poverty and debt (Kumar & Quisumbing, 2011). 

Rising electricity and fuel prices similarly undermine women’s micro-enterprises, many of which operate on thin margins and depend heavily on energy inputs. Repeated LPG and electricity price increases in countries such as India and Nigeria have reduced profits and pushed many women out of self-employment (Nnaka, 2023). Fertilizer price spikes following the Russian invasion of Ukraine also deepened food insecurity, especially among women farmers with limited access to credit and inputs (FAO, 2022).

Natural disasters reinforce the same structural inequalities. During the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, approximately 70% of fatalities were women, reflecting unequal mobility, information access, and social norms. Research from subsequent disasters — including the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2015 Nepal earthquake, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the 2022 Pakistan floods — similarly shows higher female mortality risks, greater exposure to violence, livelihood disruption, and increased unpaid care burdens during recovery (Okai, 2022). While natural disasters and macroeconomic shocks differ in nature, both reveal that inequality shapes shock absorption capacity.

From global shock to household collapse: Amina’s experience

Amina runs a small tailoring business in Khulna, Bangladesh, employing four women and selling garments in local markets and online. Her household depends both on this income and remittances from her husband who works in Qatar.

When tensions escalate in the Strait of Hormuz, the shock enters her household through two channels.

First, rising global energy prices increase transport and electricity costs in Bangladesh, raising production costs and disrupting business activity. Second, economic slowdown in the Gulf economies impacts construction activity, reducing overtime opportunities and delaying wage payments, making remittances from her husband smaller and less regular.

What appears at the macro level as inflation and remittance volatility becomes, at the household level, a contraction of productive activity and consumption. Amina reduces production, loses customers, sells equipment, and withdraws her daughter from tutoring to stabilise household finances.

The key point is not the severity of a single household story, but its representativeness: macro shocks are translated into gendered adjustment strategies within households, where women disproportionately absorb the cost.

Policy implications

If macroeconomic shocks are distributional, then macroeconomic policy must also become distribution-aware.

Three implications follow.

First, distributional effects must be integrated into macroeconomic assessment rather than treated as ex-post welfare considerations. Aggregate indicators systematically mask intra-household inequality and differentiated labour cost exposure.

Second, labour market and social protection systems must reflect differentiated vulnerabilities, particularly in informal and care-intensive sectors where women are concentrated.

Third, resilience is structurally determined. Where women have weaker access to assets, credit, and formal employment, shocks are more likely to produce persistent economic scarring rather than temporary income loss.

Ignoring these dynamics produces not only inaccurate macroeconomic analysis, but also inadequate policy responses that risk widening existing gender inequalities.

Given the limited fiscal space of many developing countries, policy responses should prioritize targeted, scalable, and externally supported measures. These may include emergency support through development banks and international financial institutions; shock-responsive social protection systems, including temporary cash transfers and targeted support for poor and vulnerable households, building on mechanisms widely used during the COVID-19 pandemic; and specific support measures for women farmers, including access to fertilizers, seeds, credit and energy inputs.

Conclusion

The Strait of Hormuz disruption highlights a broader truth about the global economy: macroeconomic shocks are not simply external disturbances to be absorbed uniformly by markets. They are distributional events transmitted through unequal social structures that are gendered. 

In practice, households often stabilise consumption during crises through hidden adjustments disproportionately carried by women: reduced food intake, expansion of unpaid labour, and withdrawal from productive activity. Women are not only more exposed to shocks; they are also more likely to bear the costs of recovery. 

For trade-focused institutions, the lesson is clear: trade policy, trade finance, and trade facilitation are not gender-neutral instruments. Building resilience requires embedding gender analysis into the design and monitoring of trade systems, rather than considering it only after crises emerge.

Recognising this is not a matter of “adding gender” to economic analysis. It is a matter of correcting how we understand the economy itself.